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In equilibrium, even if wages are exogenous and fixed, firms have incentives to strategically reduce their
capacity, to increase the quality of their worker pool. The intensity of incentives to reduce capacity is given by
a simple formula, analogous to the classic Cournot model, but depends on different moments of the
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markets with personalized wages always yield higher efficiency than markets with uniform wages, but may be
less efficient if firms reduce capacity to avoid bidding too much for star workers.
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Abstract
In two-sided matching markets participants care about who they in-
teract with in the other side, such as colleges and students or employees
and firms. This paper considers a simple equilibrium model of an imper-
fectly competitive matching market. A finite number of firms is matched
to a continuum of workers. Firms and workers may have heterogeneous
preferences over matches on the other side, and the model allows for both
uniform and personalized wages or contracts.
In equilibrium, even if wages are exogenous and fixed, firms have incen-
tives to strategically reduce their capacity, to increase the quality of their
worker pool. The intensity of firms’ incentives to reduce capacity is given
by a simple formula, analogous to the classic Cournot model. If workers
are paid uniform wages, firms distort capacity more with heterogeneous
preferences, while if workers are paid personalized wages firms have more
incentives to distort capacity with homogeneous preferences. We show
that markets with personalized wages always yield higher efficiency given
quantities, but may be less efficient if firms reduce capacity to avoid bid-
ding too much for star workers. A new rationale for unravelling is also
given, where firms hire early to obtain a first-mover advantage.
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1 Introduction
Two-sided matching markets are markets where participants on either side have
preferences over who they interact with on the other side. Examples include
matching CEOs to companies, husbands to wives, students to colleges, doctors
to hospitals, lawyers to law firms, and advertisers to content providers.1 A
stable matching is an allocation where agents do not have incentives to break
away from their matches and seek new ones. A well-known result by Roth
(1985) shows that no mechanism that always produces a stable matching is
strategyproof for the firms.2 However, even though these markets are studied by
a large literature originated by Becker (1973) and Gale and Shapley (1962), most
contributions ignore strategic behavior by firms, assuming them to command
insignificant market share, or to act naively. This is in contrast to the standard
approach in industrial organization, which typically focuses on Nash equilibrium
in imperfectly competitive markets. This paper considers the questions: What is
the optimal behavior of a firm in an imperfectly competitive matching market?,
e.g. What is the optimal admission policy for a college, how should a hospital
play in a centralized clearinghouse?. What are the equilibrium consequences of
strategic behavior?, What are the implications for the regulation and design of
these markets?.
I consider markets where agents on one side (firms) may be matched to many
agents on the other side (workers). Firms have nontrivial market share, and are
assumed to act strategically. Both workers and firms may have heterogeneous
preferences over matches in the other side. I consider both markets with uniform
wages for each worker, and markets with personalized wages or contracts. The
model is analogous to the classic Cournot model of imperfect competition in
homogeneous goods markets. In the Cournot model, firms set quantities and
prices are given by market clearing at those quantities. I follow Cournot (1838)
and Konishi and Ünver (2006), and assume that firms set quantities, and the
allocation is given by a stable matching given quantities. To make the analysis
tractable, the paper uses the matching framework of Azevedo and Leshno (2010),
where a finite number of firms is matched to a continuum of workers.3 Using the
continuum model allows us to give simple first order conditions for the firms’
optimal decisions.
A basic insight from the analysis is that some of the intuition of the Cournot
model applies to matching markets. Market power causes the marginal revenue
of a firm to be lower than the net productivity of a marginal worker. For that
reason, firms shade capacities. A surprising finding is that firms may want to
reduce quantities even if wages are fixed. The intuition is that by reducing
capacity firms with market power can increase the quality of the worker pool
1See, respectively, Gabaix and Landier (2008); Becker (1973); Gale and Shapley (1962);
Roth and Peranson (1999); Ginsburg and Wolf (2003).
2More precisely, he shows that in the college admissions problem no stable mechanism is
strategyproof for the colleges.
3Azevedo and Leshno (2010) show that this model corresponds to the limit of discrete
economies with many workers per firm.
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available to them. We provide a simple first-order condition that quantifies
firms’ incentives to reduce capacity. I provide applications of this idea, notably
to the costs and benefits of flexible versus uniform wages, and also to unravelling.
The paper compares markets with personalized and uniform wages. For
example, in the market for junior associates in elite New York law firms, most
firms pay every incoming lawyer the same wage. In contrast, senior lawyers are
often paid personalized wages (Ginsburg and Wolf (2003)). A series of papers
have debated the desirability of using personalized wages, which is a key market
design variable. Notably, Bulow and Levin (2006) have shown that uniform
wages may reduce matching efficiency, and compress wages. I show however that
if firms may shade capacities, this conclusion may be reversed. In the imperfect
competition model, there is a tradeoff. Personalized wages always generate
higher matching efficiency for a given level of capacity, but they may increase
firms’ incentives to distort capacity. If firms are very similar, personalized wages
have little impact on matching efficiency, but may induce firms drastically reduce
capacity to avoid entering in a bidding war for the best employees. In that case
markets organized around uniform wages generate higher welfare. However, if
firms are more heterogeneous, the loss from matching inefficiency dominates the
loss from capacity shading, and personalized wages generate higher efficiency.
In addition, the paper proposes a new explanation for unravelling, the phe-
nomenon of hiring dates moving earlier and earlier in labor markets. In the
model, since there are strategic complementarities between firms’ choices, un-
like perfectly competitive models, it is advantageous for firms to move first.
Therefore, firms might be willing to pay costs to hire early, to obtain a first
mover advantage, or at least compete in the same par as its rivals. This ra-
tionale for unravelling does not rely on workers having incomplete information
about their own abilities, and neither on firms hiring before revelation of infor-
mation, as is the case of most traditional models of unravelling (Li and Rosen
(1998)).
1.1 Related literature
The model is related to contributions in the industrial organization, matching,
and market design literatures. In industrial organization, it extends the Cournot
oligopoly model to matching markets. Classic themes such as strategic comple-
mentarities (Fudenberg and Tirole (1984); Bulow et al. (1985)) have important
consequences to matching markets. Moreover, most of the industrial organiza-
tion literature on two-sided markets has focused on the strategic competition
among platforms that connect buyers and sellers (Rochet and Tirole (2006)).4
In contrast, we consider the strategic behavior of firms with nontrivial market
share in one of the sides of the market.
The main departure of the present paper from the literature on assortative
matching, introduced in the seminal Becker (1973) marriage model, is that we
allow for non-transferable utility and heterogeneous preferences, so that match-
4See also Rochet and Tirole (2003); Armstrong (2006); Weyl (2007)
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ing is not necessarily assortative. Some papers in this tradition have considered
strategic behavior of firms. Most closely related to my model, Bulow and Levin
(2006); Kojima (2007); Niederle (2007) consider the effect of personalized versus
fixed wages in a matching market. Our model suggests a new tradeoff in this
personalized versus uniform wages debate, that personalized wages may increase
distortions caused by capacity manipulation. Gabaix and Landier (2008); Ter-
vio (2008); Edmans et al. (2009) study the effect of assortative matching on
wages in matching markets, and Kremer (1993) considers the same problem in
the one-sided case.
The major difference between the model and most of the literature on match-
ing with heterogeneous preferences (Gale and Shapley (1962); Roth and So-
tomayor (1992)) is that we consider nontrivial equilibrium outcomes, as opposed
to the strategyproofness of mechanisms. A stable mechanism is a mechanism
that always produces a stable matching. Several papers in this literature ex-
plore conditions for the strategyproofness of stable mechanisms. Roth (1985)
has shown that no stable mechanism is strategyproof for the colleges in the
college admissions problem. Sönmez (1997) has shown that colleges may ma-
nipulate any stable mechanism by reducing capacity. Kesten (2008) shows that,
if preferences are acyclic, it is not possible to gain by manipulating capacities.
Roth and Peranson (1999); Immorlica and Mahdian (2005); Kojima and Pathak
(2009) have given a series of results suggesting that in large markets the gains
from manipulating stable mechanisms is small. The most closely related models
to mine are in the literature on capacity manipulation games. Konishi and Ün-
ver (2006) introduced these games, where a set of firms simultaneously choose
capacities, and are assigned the corresponding stable matching. The most sub-
stantial differences of my model is that it considers a continuum framework,
and allows for matching with contracts. Konishi and Ünver (2006) have shown
that pure-strategy equilibria do not necessarily exist in these games. Subse-
quently, Kojima (2006) has shown that equilibria in mixed strategies exist, and
that firms are weakly better off in such equilibria than under truthful reporting.
Mumcu and Saglam (2009) studies games of capacity manipulation with an af-
termarket, and Ehlers (2010) characterizes student-optimal mechanisms in the
college admissions problem in terms of a strategyproofness condition.
Section 2.1 describes the baseline model, and characterizes optimality con-
ditions for firms and equilibrium. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 then extend the model to
include endogenous wages and matching with contracts, and Section 3 discusses
applications, comparing uniform and personalized wages, and providing a new
rationale for unravelling. Section 4 concludes. Proofs of all results are given in
the Appendix.
2 Model
Section 2.1 considers the baseline model, of matching with uniform and ex-
ogenous wages. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 then incorporate endogenous wages and
matching with contracts into the analysis. A casual reader may want to read
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Section 2.1 to grasp the basic model, skim over Sections 2.2 and 2.3 and proceed
to the applications in Section 3.
2.1 Baseline: matching with uniform exogenous wages
2.1.1 Firms, workers, and stable matchings
Firms i = 1, · · · , I compete for a continuum mass of workers. Abusing notation,
we also denote by I the set of firms {1, · · · , I}. Worker of type θ has productivity
eθi in [0, 1] at firm i. Note that a worker’s productivity may differ in different
firms. We denote by eθ the I-dimensional vector of worker productivity. Each
worker has a complete preference ordering θ over all firms, and over being
unmatched. Let P be the set of all strict preference relations over the set of
firms and being unmatched. The set of worker types is Θ = [0, 1]I × P. The
distribution of workers is given by a finite measure η in Θ. We make the following
assumption on the measure η.5
Assumption 2.1. (Strict preferences) The measure of all indifference curves
η({θ ∈ Θ|eθi = x}) is 0, for all firms i and productivity levels x.
The model builds upon the continuum matching model of Azevedo and
Leshno (2010). A matching is a function µ : Θ × I → I × 2Θ such that each
worker is assigned either to a firm or to itself and each firm is assigned to a set
of workers. Moreover, if a worker is matched to a firm, the firm is matched to
the worker, and vice versa.6 Consider now a vector of capacities q. We say that
a matching µ is stable (with respect to [η, q]) if7
1. Firms’ capacity constraints are respected.
2. No worker or firm receives an unacceptable match.
3. No firm-worker pair could be made better off by matching to each other.
4. µ is right-continuous.
5For the sake of rigour, we make standard measurability assumptions. Note that Θ is the
union of a finite number of I dimensional cubes. The measure η is assumed to be defined over
the Borelians of Θ. Moreover, a matching (defined below) has to be measurable with respect
to the σ-algebra generated by the Borelians.
6Mathematically, for all θ ∈ Θ, µ(θ) ∈ I ∪ {θ} and for all i ∈ I, µ(i) ∈ 2Θ. In addition,
i = µ(θ) iff θ ∈ µ(i). In addition, we require the matching to be measurable with respect to
the σ-algebra generated by the Borelians of Θ (see footnote 5).
7Formally,
1. For all i we have η(µ(i)) ≤ qi,
2. If µ(θ) = i, then i θ θ.
3. If i θ µ(θ), then η(µ(i)) = qi, and for all θ′ ∈ µ(i) we have eθ
′
i ≥ eθi .
4. For all sequences θk, with θ = limk→∞ θk, and all eθ
k ≥ eθ, we have µ(θ) =
limk→∞ µ(θ
k).
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Conditions 1-3 are analogous to those in the definition of a stable matching
in the discrete college admissions model of Gale and Shapley (1962). A sta-
ble matching is is a resting point for the market, where agents cannot gain by
breaking off their matches and seeking new ones. Markets organized around
centralized clearinghouses often use algorithms that produce stable matchings.
Roth (1991) gives evidence that market clearinghouses organized around stable
allocations tend to thrive, while those that are not tend to unravel and even-
tually collapse. In decentralized markets, there is also evidence that sometimes
outcomes correspond to stable matchings. Hitsch et al. (2010) and Sorensen
(2007) give evidence that matchings in an online dating website, and among
venture capitalists and biotechnology firms are stable. Some theoretical models
give conditions under which decentralized matching processes result in stable
matchings (Adachi (2003); Niederle and Yariv (2009)), at least when search
frictions are small. Moreover, Roth and Vate (1990) show that a stable match-
ing can be achieved by starting with any matching, and having blocking pairs
randomly break their current connections and match to better partners. These
findings motivate using stability as a solution concept in a first pass at modelling
imperfect competition in matching markets. As for condition 4, it is a technical
condition, which avoids multiplicity of stable matchings which coincide up to
measure 0, and simplifies the analysis without sacrificing generality. Note that
condition 3 must hold pointwise. That is, no firm-worker pair can be better off
matching outside the allocation, not even a measure 0 set of workers.
The following result gives sufficient conditions for a unique stable matching
to exist. Let T = {θ ∈ Θ|i θ θ ∀ i ∈ I}.
Proposition 2.2. If all subsets of T of the form
({eθ < p}\{eθ < p′}) ∩ T
with p′ ≤ p and p′ 6= p have strictly positive η measure, then for all q there
exists a unique stable matching with respect to [η, q]. This holds, in particular,
if η has full support.
Henceforth, we will simply take η such that for all q there exists a unique
stable matching (with respect to [η, q]). The Proposition guarantees that there
is no great loss of generality in doing so, as we could for example have assumed
that η has full support.8 Moreover, Azevedo and Leshno (2010) show that, when
the continuum model has a unique stable matching, it equals the limit of the set
of stable matchings of any approximating sequence of discrete economies. This
justifies using the continuum model as an approximation of discrete economies
with a large number of workers per firm.
Assumption 2.3. (Uniqueness) For all q, there exists a unique stable match-
ing with respect to [η, q].
8In addition, AL show that as long as η satisfies minimal smoothness requirements, for
almost every q there is a unique matching stable with respect to [η, q]. Therefore, uniqueness
is the typical case in this model.
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2.1.2 The game
We now lay out the oligopoly game considered, where the players are the firms
I. The primitives are I,Θ, η, c(·), wi, Qi.
1. Firms simultaneously choose capacities qi in compact intervals Qi.
2. After capacity choices q, workers are hired according to the unique match-
ing µq stable with respect to [η, q].
3. Each firm’s payoff is given by
Πi =
ˆ
µq(i)
[eθi − wi]dη(θ)− ci(qi), (1)
where wi is firm i’s wage, and the continuously differentiable function ci(·)
is the cost of investing in capacity. That is, profits are the integral of the
productivity of the workers hired, net of the wage, minus the costs of
investing in capacity.
Therefore, the game corresponds to a situation where firms simultaneously com-
mit to capacity choices. Workers are then assigned according to a stable match-
ing, holding capacities fixed. The model is the matching analogue of the Cournot
(1838) model in homogeneous good markets. In the next sections, we will gener-
alize the model, to consider the case where firms may set wages wi, and also the
case where wages are personalized for each worker. Because stable matchings are
used to model centralized and decentralized outcomes, this can correspond to a
variety of situations, which need not even be labor markets. For concreteness,
we will maintain the firm-worker terminology, until we discuss applications, but
the following examples should also be kept in mind.
1. In the United States, every year 25,000 new medical school graduates
apply to residency positions in hospitals through a centralized clearing-
house, the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP).9 In several
other countries, doctors are matched to residency positions in similar
clearinghouses.10 The algorithm used by the NRMP, and many other
clearinghouses, is a variant of the deferred acceptance mechanism, pro-
posed by Gale and Shapley (1962), and always produces a stable match-
ing. Although the deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for the
doctors, it is not strategy-proof for the hospitals. One interpretation of the
model is that c(·) ≡ 0, and hospitals with real capacity q̄i are strategically
deciding whether to misrepresent their capacities.
9See Roth and Peranson (1999). One aspect in which application does not fit the model
well, is that the number of doctors matched to each program is small, and the continuum
model represents a large number of doctors. In addition, the mechanism used is not exactly
equal to the deferred acceptance mechanism, as it includes special provisions for couples, for
example.
10Roth (1991)
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2. In Hungary and Turkey, college admissions are coordinated by centralized
clearinghouses, which use the deferred acceptance mechanism. Similar
mechanisms are used for assigning students to public high schools in Hun-
gary, and in some American cities.11 The model can be interpreted as an
equilibrium model of how universities or schools behave in the mechanism.
3. In a hypothetical country, the majority of the best and brightest students
of each generation attend one of a handful of elite universities. Therefore,
each one of these has a relatively large share of the market, and some
market power. Capacity investment, in dormitories and other facilities, is
made a year in advance. Although the admissions process is decentralized,
it approximately corresponds to a stable matching.
4. Two hypothetical strategic consulting companies, B and M, control most
of the market for new college graduates going into the business. In each
firm, all entering employees are paid the same wage. They choose the
number of hires (and possibly wages) a month in advance of the market,
which is decentralized but produces a stable matching.
5. In the United States, many of the graduates of the nation’s best law
schools join one of the top law firms in the country (Ginsburg and Wolf
(2003)). The entry level position in this market is referred to as associate.
An interesting feature of this market is that inside each firm the vast
majority of associates are paid the same wage. Moreover, across firms,
wages are mostly the same, with even the end of year bonuses being equal.
Despite compensation being uniform across firms, candidates have strong
preferences over firms, and pay close attention to prestige rankings in
the industry. Most firms hire a large number of associates every year,
sometimes over 100. Moreover, since firms only compete directly with
other firms with a similar prestige ranking, it is reasonable to assume that
they have some market power.
6. In markets for highly differentiated services, buyers and sellers may have
(possibly heterogeneous) preferences over trade partners. For example,
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (Sorensen (2007)), advertisers and
content providers (newspapers, content websites, search engines, or tele-
vision channels). Moreover, in some of these markets, firms on one of the
sides have large market share, and therefore have some market power (e.g.
Google, Yahoo!, Bing and Baidu’s large share of the search engine adver-
tisement market, or CBS, NBC, ABC, Fox and Univision’s large share of
the American broadcast TV market).
The solution concept we adopt for most of the analysis is pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium. Let Q = ×iQi. A profile q∗ ∈ Q is an equilibrium if
Πi(q
∗) ≥ Πi(qi, q∗−i),
11See Balinski and Sönmez (1999); Biró (2007); Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2009).
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for all i and qi ∈ Qi. In some cases, pure strategy equilibria may fail to exist.
We define a mixed strategy as a probability distribution σi over Qi. We will
abuse notation and denote expected payoffs given a mixed strategy profile by
Π(σ). A profile of mixed strategies σ∗ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
if it is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game where action spaces are
∆Qi. Azevedo and Leshno (2010) show that, in our setting, the unique stable
matching with respect to [η, q] varies continuously in q. This guarantees that a
mixed strategy equilibrium always exists.
Proposition 2.4. At least one mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
2.1.3 Cutoffs
In this section we make a preliminary observation, which is a centerpiece of
the analysis. We note that any stable matching must have a very particular
structure. Moreover, stable matchings can be defined in a decentralized way,
by considering the productivity of a marginal hired worker at each firm. A
cutoff is simply a threshold pi in [0, 1], such that firm i accepts workers with
a productivity higher than pi, and rejects workers with lower productivity. A
cutoff vector is a vector p specifying cutoffs for each firm. Given cutoffs, we may
define a worker’s demand as her favorite firm that would accept her. That is,
Dθ(p) = arg max
θ
{i|pi ≤ eθi }.
To simplify notation, we assume that Dθ(p) is an I dimensional vector, with
value 1 in the coordinate corresponding to the chosen firm, and 0 in the other
coordinates. We can then define aggregate demand as the I dimensional vector
D(p) =
ˆ
Dθ(p)dη(θ).
We now define a market clearing cutoff
Definition 2.5. A cutoff vector p is a market clearing cutoff with respect to
[η, q] if for all i
Di(p) ≤ qi
with equality if pi > 0.
The first observation we make is that there is a natural bijection between
market clearing cutoffs and stable matchings. Given a stable matching µ, con-
sider the operator p = Pµ, where
pi = min
µ(i)
eθi ,
if η(µ(i)) = qi, and pi = 0 otherwise. And given a market clearing cutoff p let
µ =Mp where
µ(θ) = Dθ(p).
We then have
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Lemma 2.6. (Cutoff Lemma - Azevedo and Leshno (2010)) Given [η, q], there
exists a unique market clearing cutoff p. Let µ be the unique stable matching.
Then p = Pµ and µ =Mp.
Azevedo and Leshno (2010) give a more general statement of this Lemma,
in the case where there may be multiple stable matchings. The intuition is that
there is a parametrization of stable matchings by the admission thresholds in
each firm. The possibility of such a parametrization is suggested by a result
by Roth and Sotomayor (1989), who show that the pools of workers hired by
a firm in different stable matchings are always ordered by first order stochastic
dominance. The cutoff Lemma generalizes a similar characterization by Ab-
dulkadiroglu et al. (2008), who introduced the term cutoffs, in a setting where
all firms have the same preferences. Note that, in the discrete college admissions
problem, a similar result holds, with the caveat that a single stable matching
may correspond to several market clearing cutoffs. The fact that this relation-
ship is bijective in the continuum model makes it more tractable. In the discrete
setting, this alternative definition of stability was stated in a different form by
Biró (2007). We refer the interested reader to Azevedo and Leshno (2010) for
proofs and a discussion of the result in both discrete and continuous settings.
In addition to being an admission threshold, a cutoff pi is the productivity
of a marginal hired (or rejected) worker at firm i. Therefore, we may think of
cutoffs as being the marginal value of capacity for firm i,12 holding the pool of
applicants fixed. As the shadow price of capacity, cutoffs share many properties
with prices. Indeed, this analogy and basic price theory will be a central part of
our argument, and we will analyze distortions caused by market power as wedges
between marginal revenues and cutoffs faced by firms with nontrivial market
share. However, we must caution that cutoffs are not prices. Therefore, several
price theoretical insights do not carry over to cutoffs. For example, unlike prices,
an agent may only demand a firm if her productivity at that firm is greater than
the cutoff. Consequently, ratios between cutoffs are not informative of marginal
rates of substitution. This dual interpretation of cutoffs is in the same spirit of a
characterization of stable matchings due to Adachi (2000), who shows that stable
matchings can be parametrized by the utilities of agents on both sides of the
matching. This influential idea has been fruitfully applied to several problems
in matching theory (Echenique and Oviedo (2004, 2006); Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005); Ostrovsky (2008)). However, it is different from cutoffs, which only
require keeping track of one threshold for each firm, as opposed to a reservation
value for each firm and a reservation value for each worker.
2.1.4 Equilibrium
Cutoffs play a major role in the analysis of the oligopoly game. As explained
in the definition of the game, each strategy profile q induces a unique stable
matching µq. Henceforth, we will denote by P (q) the vector of market clearing
cutoffs associated with µq. That is, the function P gives the productivity Pi(q)
12That is, net of wages and investment costs.
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Figure 1: The relevant portion of the set of agent types in example 2.8. The
left square represents agents who prefer firm 1, and the right square agents who
prefer firm 2. Coordinates correspond to productivities. The numbers denote
the firm to which agents in each region are matched, for a cutoff vector (p1, p2).
The red lines represent the regions ∆12 and ∆21 of agents which are in the
margin of switching firms, which are used to define the quantities Mij and P̄ij
in Proposition 2.11.
of a marginal hired worker at firm i when the quantities played are q. First note
that, when a firm increases its quantity, it lowers cutoffs facing all firms.
Lemma 2.7. If q′ ≥ q, then P (q′) ≤ P (q).
This is the continuum analogue of the comparative statics results of Gale
and Sotomayor (1985a,b). To clarify the definitions, and develop intuition, we
now consider a simple example.
Example 2.8. There are two firms, which have a maximum capacity of 1, so
that Qi = [0, 1]. For simplicity, assume that wages and the cost of capacity are
wi ≡ ci(·) ≡ 0. There is a mass 1 of agents with preference list θ= 1, 2, θ and a
mass 1 with preferences 2, 1, θ. Productivity vectors eθ are uniformly distributed
in [0, 1]2, and independent of preferences. Figure 1 depicts the relevant portion
of the set of agent types. Note that, since all workers are productive, the most
efficient allocation would be for all of them to be employed. If both firms set
qi = 1, all workers are hired by their favorite firm, implying cutoffs pi = 0.
Consider now the market clearing equations for this economy. If capacities
are given by q, market clearing equations are
qi = (1 + p−i)(1− pi).
That is, for each firm i, a measure 1− pi of the agents with preferences i,−i, θ
are accepted. Plus, a measure p−i(1−pi) of the agents with preferences −i, i, θ,
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which were rejected by firm −i. Figure 1 illustrates the allocation given cut-
offs. These equations have a unique solution, which defines the unique market
clearing cutoff P (q) as a function of capacities. For example, assume firm 1
sets a quantity of q1 = 1/2, while firm 2 sets q2 = 1. Solving the system then
yields P1 = (
√
17 + 1)/8 ≈ .64, and P2 = (
√
17 − 1)/8 ≈ .39. Therefore, when
firm 1 reduces its capacity to 1/2, it becomes more selective, and raises its cut-
off, from 0 to .64. Even though firm 2 is still supplying full capacity q2 = 1,
its cutoff also goes up, albeit only to .39. Even though we computed the sta-
ble matching using the market clearing equations, Azevedo and Leshno (2010)
show that it could also be computed as the outcome of the continuum version
of the deferred acceptance mechanism. Since there is a unique stable matching,
it does not matter whether the worker-proposing or firm-proposing version of
the algorithm is used, the outcome is the same. However, cutoffs provide an
analytically convenient way to compute the stable matching.
The market clearing equations can also be used to calculate optimal strate-
gies by each firm. Due to the uniform distribution, profits are given by Πi =
qi · (1 + pi)/2. To find the optimal q, we use the implicit function theorem to
calculate the marginal revenue to firm i increasing its capacity. Straightforward
algebra shows that
MRi = Pi − (1− Pi)
1− Pi
2
(−dP−i
dqi
).
In a symmetric equilibrium, we must have MRi(q∗, q∗) = 0. Solving this equa-
tion we get q∗ = 4
√
5−8 ≈ .94. Therefore, in equilibrium, some workers remain
unemployed, even though firms cannot affect wages wi = 0, and there are no
costs of providing more capacity.
The puzzling feature of the example is that firms do not hire some workers
with positive net productivity, even though they have enough capacity to do so.
The reason why firms choose to reduce capacity in equilibrium is the possibility
of rejection chains (Sönmez (1997)). That is, by rejecting a worker, the firm
sends him back to the worker pool. The rejected worker may then be hired by
a competing firm, which will in turn reject another worker. Possibly, this newly
rejected worker will then apply to the original firm, and be more productive than
the original rejected worker. By reducing capacity, firms are shedding marginal
workers, but they may gain workers who are marginal to the other firms. If
preferences are not perfectly correlated, these workers may be better than the
rejected workers.
To gain some insight into this mechanism, we now consider an expression
for the marginal revenue, net of wages and investment costs of each firm. That
is, let
Ri(q) =
ˆ
µq(i)
eθi dη(θ), and
MRi(q) = ∂qiRi(q),
12
in the case where this derivative exists. We now restrict attention to interior
points.
Definition 2.9. A vector of strategies q̃ is interior if it is in the interior of the
set {q ∈ ×iQi|η(µq(i)) = qi}.
In any interior equilibrium q∗, if profits are differentiable, then firm i’s quan-
tity choice must satisfy the first order condition:
Proposition 2.10. In any equilibrium q∗ where firm i’s profits Πi(q) are dif-
ferentiable in qi and q∗ is an interior point we have
MRi(q
∗) = wi + c
′(qi).
This expression is analogous to the first order condition facing a firm in the
Cournot oligopoly model (Figure 3). It says that the marginal productivity gain
from increasing quantity must equal the marginal cost in wages and investment
in capacity. If firm i has no market power, increasing the quantity of hires by a
small amount dq would add dq marginal workers, of productivity Pi to its worker
pool. Therefore marginal revenue would be MRi = Pi. However, when firms
have market power, rejection chains induce a wedge between marginal revenue
MRi and cutoffs Pi. In the case where η admits a continuous density f , there
is a simple intuitive expression for this wedge. Denote the set of workers which
would be accepted at firm i, but are marginally accepted by a firm j that the
worker prefers as
∆ij(q) = {eθi ≥ pi, eθj = pj , j θ i θ θ, k θ i⇒ eθk < pk},
where p = P (q). Roughly speaking, these are the workers which firms i and j
compete for, and firm i may hope to poach them from firm j (see Figure 1). Let
Mij =
ˆ
∆ij
f(θ)dθ,
P̄ij =
ˆ
∆ij
eθi f(θ)dθ/Mij if Mij 6= 0
= Pi if Mij = 0.
That is, Mij is the I−1 dimensional mass of the set ∆ij of disputed agents, and
P̄ij is their average productivity. If firm i has some market power, its quantity
decisions affect the cutoff Pj . Therefore, by reducing quantity, firm i increases
the cutoffs of firm j, and gains some of the agents in the disputed set ∆ij .
That is, by rejecting a small mass of agents dq, firm i can cause firm j to reject
some of the agents in ∆ij , which will then apply to firm i via a rejection chain.
We have the following expression for the wedge between marginal revenue and
productivity of a marginal worker.
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Theorem 2.11. Assume η admits a continuous density f . Then P (q) is con-
tinuously differentiable at almost every interior point q, and
MRi(q) = Pi(q)−
∑
j 6=i
[P̄ij(q)− Pi(q)] ·Mij(q) · (−
dPj(q)
dqi
).
Consequently, MRi(q) ≤ Pi(q).
The intuition for this formula is as follows. When firm i reduces capacity by
dq, it loses a measure dq of workers. If firm i had no market power, those workers
would have productivity equal to the cutoff, Pi, and hence the first term. The
second term measures the distortions caused by market power. If firm i may
affect the cutoffs of other firms, by hiring more workers it loses some workers in
the set ∆ij , which are marginal to firm j, but may be better than marginal for
firm i. The difference P̄ij −Pi measures this difference in productivity, and the
term Mij · (−dPjdqi ) measures the mass of workers in this marginal set that are
displaced. The intuition can be further clarified by considering the particular
case of example 2.8. Figure 2 displays the effect of a small increase in quantity
dq for firm 1. This increase in q1 leads both p1 and p2 to decrease, so that cutoffs
move from p to p′. The set of workers gained by firm 1 is highlighted as the
two blue rectangles, while the set of workers that are lost is highlighted as the
yellow rectangle. Notice that the workers gained have productivities close to p1.
Hence, if firm has negligible market power, and its increase in quantity has a
small effect in the cutoff of firm 2, the mass of workers lost would be small, and
marginal revenue would be close to p1. However, if that is not the case, firm
1 also has to take into account that it loses the mass of workers in the yellow
rectangle. Those workers have average quality P̄12. In addition, the total mass
of workers lost must be approximately M12 · (−dP2/dq1) · dq. Therefore, the
change in revenue is approximately {p1 − (P̄12 − p) ·M12 · (−dP2/dq1)}dq.
The wedge between the productivity of a marginal worker and marginal
revenue is analogous to the wedge between prices and marginal quantities in the
Cournot model. Figure 3 plots marginal revenue and cutoffs, as a function of the
quantity chosen by firm i,. Note that the marginal revenue curve MRi is lower
than the cutoff curve Pi. Moreover, when qi = 0, we have that P̄ij = Pi = 1,
so that MRi = Pi. Note that the first order condition for firm i is to provide
quantity up to the point where the marginal revenue curve crosses the marginal
cost plus wages curve, wi + c′i. Therefore, the equilibrium quantity is given by
the point q∗ < 1. At this point, we have Pi > MRi = wi + c′i. Therefore,
in equilibrium the firms do not hire some workers with strictly positive net
productivity.
Equilibrium does not rely on firms reasoning through the rejection chains
they set off. All that is necessary is that firms set their quantities optimally given
the strategies of other firms. In several markets, firms (which may represent
colleges, hospitals, or television networks) do seem to spend a lot of time deciding
the quantities to be supplied. A college, for example, faces a quantity versus
quality tradeoff when deciding on the size of each year’s entering class. The
14
Figure 2: The effects of a small increase in quantity by firm 1.
Figure 3: Marginal revenue MRi(q), and the cutoff Pi(q), as a function of qi
keeping q−i fixed. The best response is denoted q∗i .
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equilibrium assumption is that the college gets this decision right, by any mix
of trial and error, experience, or abstraction. However, it does not depend on
each college fully understanding its impact on the rest of the market.
Notice that, if all n firms were acting in unison, as a monopolist maximizing
profits, they would have even greater incentives for reducing capacity. Under
suitable differentiability assumptions, at an interior point q we may write the
first order condition with respect to qi as
MRi(q) +
∑
j 6=i
dΠj
dqi
≤MRi(q).
where we used the fact that all dΠj/dqi ≤ 0.13 Therefore, a cartel has more
incentives for quantity reduction than the oligopolists.
An immediate consequence of the previous discussion is that quantity distor-
tions in markets with fixed wages are driven by preference heterogeneity. The
reason why firm i can profit from rejection chains is that it may reject a worker
θ that is accepted by firm j, and that leads firm j to reject a better worker
θ′. However, if firms i and j have the same preferences this is not possible. It
can also be shown that when workers have the same preferences, such rejection
chains are not profitable either.
Proposition 2.12. Assume that q is interior and either
(1) (Homogeneous ordinal worker preferences) All worker types in the sup-
port of θ have the same preference ordering θ, or
(2) (Homogeneous ordinal firm preferences) For any two worker types θ 6= θ′
in the support of η, we have that either eθi > eθ
′
i for all i or eθi < eθ
′
i for all i.
Then MRi = Pi.
This Proposition is in line with results from the discrete matching litera-
ture, which show that stable mechanisms are strategyproof when preferences
are acyclic (Kesten (2008)).14 It implies that, in settings where agents are or-
dered by some vertical measure of quality, there is no quantity reduction in
matching with fixed wages. We will see that the opposite result holds in match-
ing with flexible wages. Therefore, a major part of our comparison of flexible
and fixed wages depends on whether preferences are heterogeneous.
There is another way to frame firms’ first order condition, which yields an
analogue of the classic Lerner index formula. Let the average productivity of
13This follows from the monotonicity result in Lemma 2.7.
14It is possible to prove such a result in our setting. That is, that under a condition
analogous to the condition used by Kesten in the discrete setting firms have no incentives to
reduce capacity. This can be derived for example using the Kesten result and Theorem 2 of
Azevedo and Leshno (2010), which shows that the stable matching of a continuum economy
correspond to the limits of stable matchings of discrete economies. We consider the less
general form of the Proposition above for simplicity, and focus instead on the equilibrium
consequences of firms manipulating capacity, as opposed to conditions for strategyproofness.
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accepted workers be given by
P̄i(q) =
ˆ
µ(i)
eθi dη/η(µ(i)) if η(µ(i)) 6=0,
= 0 otherwise.
At an interior point q, we may write firm i’s profits as
Πi = (P̄i(q)− wi) · qi − ci(qi).
Assuming P̄i is differentiable, we can denote the elasticity of quantity q̄i with
respect to average productivity P̄i as εi = −P̄i/q∂qi P̄i. Then, at any interior
equilibrium q∗ firm i’s first order condition can be written
P̄i(q
∗)− wi − c′i(q∗i )
P̄ (q∗)
=
1
εi
.
The term on the left is the fraction of the marginal worker’s productivity that
is above wages plus investment costs. The optimality condition says that this
markup must equal the inverse of the elasticity of quantity with respect to
average worker productivity. Therefore, the quantity setting game with fixed
wages is equivalent to a Cournot oligopoly game, where the demand curve is
replaced by the average productivity curve.15
2.2 Matching with uniform endogenous wages
In the previous section, we have taken wages wi at each firm to be fixed and
exogenous. While this may be realistic for some applications (e.g. admissions to
public schools), in other settings it is more natural to consider wages as an en-
dogenous strategic variable, which firms control (e.g. two companies competing
for employees). This section shows that the arguments in the previous section
extend to the case where the wage is endogenous. Moreover, the model yields
predictions on the level of equilibrium wages.
Denote a cardinal agent type by θu. Each cardinal type derives utility
uθui + wi from being employed at firm i receiving wage wi. The utility of being
unemployed is normalized to 0. Utilities belong to a compact interval U . More-
over, a cardinal type θu has a productivity vector eθu ∈ [0, 1]I which specifies
her productivity at each firm. The set of cardinal types is Θu = [0, 1]I×U I . Let
ηu be a measure over cardinal types. We maintain assumption 2.1 that firms
have strict preferences in the cardinal type space. Moreover, we assume that
there is no positive mass of agents that has exactly the same certainty equivalent
between two choices.
15The analogy with the Cournot model illuminates the issue of equilibrium existence. The
Cournot model may fail to have pure strategy equilibria, even under well behaved parameters
(Roberts and Sonnenschein (1976)). However, in many concrete example it does have pure
strategy equilibria. In particular examples of the present model, it is often the case that the
functions Πi(q) are quasiconcave in qi, and therefore that a pure strategy equilibrium exists
(Fudenberg and Tirole (1991); Glicksberg (1952)). In addition, when ci ≡ wi ≡ 0, then log
concavity of the function P̄i(q) in qi implies that Πi(q) is quasiconcave, and therefore that a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
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Assumption 2.13. (Strict preferences) For all x, i, j the sets
{uθui = x}
and
{uθui − u
θu
j = x}
have ηu measure 0.
Under this assumption, for any vector of wages w, the set of workers who are
indifferent between two firms has measure 0. Therefore, any pair [ηu, w] induces
a distribution η([ηu, w]) over the (ordinal) set of worker types Θ. We make the
assumption that there is a unique stable matching given a measure η and vector
of quantities, as in the case of exogenous wages.
Assumption 2.14. (Uniqueness) For all q, w in space Q ×W of strategies
there is a unique matching stable with respect to [η([ηu, w]), q].
We define the oligopoly game with endogenous wages as follows.
1. Firms simultaneously chose quantities qi and wages wi from compact in-
tervals Qi and Wi.
2. After choices q, w, workers are hired according to the unique matching
µq,w stable with respect to [η([ηu, w]), q].
3. Payoffs are given as before by equation 1.
We will maintain the solution concepts, pure and mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium. As in the case of exogenous wages, the results from Azevedo and Leshno
(2010) guarantee that payoffs depend continuously on q, w. Consequently, at
least one mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2.15. The oligopoly game with endogenous wages has at least one
mixed strategy equilibrium.
Denote by P (q, w) and P̄ (q, w) the vectors of market clearing cutoffs and of
average productivities given a quantity wage pair.
Theorem 2.16. Assume ηu admits a continuous density, and that P̄ is con-
tinuously differentiable at an interior point (q, w). Then marginal revenue with
respect to quantity is given by the formula in Proposition 2.11, and the derivative
of profits with respect to wages is
∂wiΠi(q, w) = ∂wi P̄ (q, w)− 1.
The Theorem guarantees that the basic first order condition of the optimal
quantity choices is preserved in the model with endogenous wages. In a pure-
strategy equilibrium, even if wages are endogenous, whatever the level of wages
the same tradeoff analysed in the previous section must hold. Consequently, it
is still the case that firms choose to reduce quantities, and do not hire workers
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with strictly positive productivity net of wages and investment costs, when
preferences are not perfectly correlated.
As for wage setting, the Theorem shows that in any interior pure-strategy
equilibrium, the derivative of average productivity with respect to wages has to
be equal to 1. That is, at the optimum, an increase of $1 in wages increases av-
erage productivity of the hired workers by exactly $1, holding quantity fixed. If
the gain in productivity were greater, firms would be willing to increase wages,
and were it smaller they would gain by reducing wages. Moreover, the num-
ber of workers whose ordinal preferences would change depends on how many
workers are close to indifferent between two firms, or between working for a
firm and being unemployed (which can be viewed as pursuing some alternative
employment, in home production or in an unmodeled nonstrategic set of firms).
Therefore, wages may be very low, and perhaps pushed towards the boundary
condition wi = minWi, if workers’ decisions are relatively inelastic with respect
to wages. On the other hand, if there is a large mass of workers that can po-
tentially be poached from other firms, wages can be high, and even in the right
boundary wi = maxWi of the set of possible wages.
2.3 Matching with contracts
2.3.1 Firms, workers, and stable matchings with contracts
So far we have assumed that, within each firm, all workers are paid the same
wage. However, this is not a realistic assumption in some markets. In many
cases, firms and workers may be able to negotiate not only personalized salaries,
but also terms of employment. For example, an economics department hiring an
assistant professor may negotiate her salary, teaching load, and research bud-
get. Moreover, different job candidates may receive different offers from the
same department. Not only are flexible contracts common, but the choice of
how much amplitude agents should have to personalize contracts is an impor-
tant market design variable, and the subject of some debate (Bulow and Levin
(2006)). In this section, we consider quantity manipulation games when wages
are personalized. We will use the model of matching with contracts introduced
by Azevedo and Leshno (2010). This framework is similar to models of match-
ing with contracts introduced by Kelso Jr and Crawford (1982) and Hatfield
and Milgrom (2005).16 The main differences are that it considers a continuum
of workers and simpler preference structures.
A contract x = (i, θ, w) specifies a firm i, a worker θ, and other terms of
employment w. The set of all available contracts is denoted by X. X also
includes a null contract ∅, which corresponds to being unmatched. Firms i ∈ I
have a profit function πi(x) that prescribes its profit for each contract which
it may be part of. Workers θ ∈ ΘX have utility functions uθ(x) over contracts
that include them. We normalize the profits and utility of being unmatched to
0. Workers are distributed according to a measure ηX over ΘX . A matching,
µ : Θ ∪ I → X × 2X assigns each worker to either the empty contract or to a
16See also Hatfield et al. (2010); Hatfield and Kojima (2009, 2010)
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contract that contains her, and each firm to a set of contracts that contain her
(possibly the empty set). Consider now a vector of capacities q. A matching is
said to be stable (with respect to [ηX , q]) if17
1. Firms’ capacity constraints are respected.
2. No worker is assigned to a firm she considers unacceptable.
3. No firm-worker pair could be made better off by matching to each other.
Note that the conditions are analogous to those of section 2. The main difference
is the omission of the right continuity condition. That condition was useful
in section 2 to avoid some multiplicities in the set of stable matchings up to
measure 0, which were not consequential to the game. In the case of matching
with contracts, it is somewhat more intricate to formulate a similar condition,
and the expositional gains are small, so we omit it.
For simplicity, we now assume that the only term which agents may vary in
contracts are wages.18 That is
X = I ×ΘX ×<.
Moreover, we assume that agents have quasilinear preferences, so that for any
contract x = (i, θ, w) we have πi(x) = eθi − w, and uθ(x) = uθi + w.19 While
the Azevedo and Leshno (2010) model does not depend on this assumption,
and it is straightforward to extend the model without it, we maintain it for
concreteness, as it clarifies the role of flexible wages in quantity competition.
Given a worker-firm pair, we may define the total surplus from the match as
sθi = u
θ
i + e
θ
i . Henceforth, we will assume that the set of surplus vectors sθ of
all worker types equals [0, 1]I . We will make the following assumption, which
plays a similar role to strict preferences in the case of fixed wages.
Assumption 2.17. (Strict preferences) All level sets of the surplus function
of firm i, and of the difference in surplus between two firms have η measure 0.
That is, for all y ∈ < and i 6= j ∈ I we have
η({θ|sθi = y}) = η({θ|sθi − sθj = y}) = 0.
17Mathematically, these conditions can be state as follows.
1. For all i η({θ|a contract x = (i, θ, w) ∈ µ(i)}) ≤ qi.
2. For all θ, if µ(θ) = x, then uθ(x) ≥ 0.
3. There is no firm-worker pair i, θ, and contract x = (i, θ, w) such that uθ(x) > uθ(µ(θ)),
and either η({θ|a contract x = (i, θ, w) ∈ µ(i)}) < qi or there is x′ ∈ µ(i) such that πi(x′) <
πi(x).
18The loss of generality in this assumption is actually smaller than it seems. See Echenique
(2010)
19So far, I have postponed making measurability assumptions. This is for simplicity, and
because measurability does not play a big role in the analysis. However, with the quasilinearity
assumptions, it is easy to make the appropriate requirements. We assume that ΘX is the set
[0, 1]2I of all (u, e) vectors, with the σ algebra generated by the Borelians. Therefore X is
just the union of a finite number of cylinders in Euclidean space, and we also endow it with
the Borelian σ algebra. Matchings are assumed to be measurable.
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Azevedo and Leshno (2010)show that, under this assumption, stable match-
ings correspond to market clearing cutoffs. A cutoff pi ∈ [0, 1] specifies a thresh-
old for firm i, such that it will only accept contracts that yield profits in excess
of pi. Equivalently, it may be thought as the profits derived from a marginal
selected (or rejected) contract, or as the shadow price of capacity. Given a stable
matching µ, the associated cutoffs are given by p = Pµ, where
pi = inf
x∈µ(i)
πi(x),
if ηX(µ(i)) = qi or 0 otherwise.20 Given cutoffs, demand for each firm is
Di(p) = ηX(θ|sθi − pi ≥ sθj − pj for all j in I and sθj − pj ≥ 0}.
Similarly to matching with fixed wages, there are mild conditions that guar-
antee that an economy has a unique market clearing cutoff.
Proposition 2.18. If all subsets of ΘX of the form
{sθ < p}\{sθ < p′}
with p′ ≤ p and p′ 6= p have strictly positive ηX measure, then for all q there is
a unique market clearing cutoff with respect to [ηX , q]. This holds, in particular,
if ηX has full support.
Based on this Proposition, henceforth we will simply assume uniqueness.
Assumption 2.19. (Uniqueness) For all q there exists a unique market clear-
ing cutoff with respect to [ηX , q].
Under these assumptions, the set of stable matchings has the following simple
characterization.
Lemma 2.20. There exists a unique market clearing cutoff p, solving
Di(p) ≤ qi,
with equality if pi > 0. There exist (possibly more than one) stable matchings.
For every stable matching µ, Pµ = p. Moreover,
µ(θ) ∈ arg max
i∈I∪{∅}
sθi − pi,
where we define sθ∅ − p∅ = 0.
The Lemma guarantees the existence of stable matchings, and of a market
clearing cutoff. In addition, any stable matching corresponds to the unique
market clearing cutoff. Moreover, the Lemma says that each agent is matched
to the firm where sθi − pi is the highest. Intuitively, this is the firm which is
willing to bid more for the agent, in a combination of wages and match specific
20Here we have abused notation by denoting the set of workers matched to i as µ(i).
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utility uθi . An important difference between matching with contracts and with
fixed wages, is that in matching with contracts a single market clearing cutoff
may correspond to several stable matchings. The basic reason is that, given an
allocation of workers to firms, wages are not uniquely determined. Consider a
worker θ that is assigned to firm i. Firm i would be willing to pay the worker a
share of up to sθi − pi of the total surplus sθi of the relationship. If the worker’s
second best choice is firm j, the worker would demand receiving at least a share
sθj − pj of the surplus, or else she would rather match with firm j. Therefore,
the worker’s utility from the match may be any point in the interval
sθj − pj ≤ uθi + wage ≤ sθi − pi.
Since for given quantities there are multiple stable matchings, in defining the
oligopoly game we must specify how to select one of them. For simplicity, we will
assume that the selected matching is that in which the firm has all the bargaining
power, and captures all of the gains of the relationship vis a vis the worker’s
second best offer. That is, wages are such that each worker is just indifferent
between working for the firm that hires it, or joining the second best alternative.
Formally, given cutoffs p, consider a worker θ. If i∗ = arg maxi∈I∪{∅} sθi −pi, let
ūθ = max
I∪{∅}\{i∗}
sθi − pi.
We will assume that the worker’s wage is such that uθi∗ + wage = ūθ, so that
the firm i∗ derives surplus
π(x) = eθi − wage = pi + (sθi − pi)− ūθ = sθi − ūθ
from hiring worker θ. We will say that a stable matching that satisfies this
equation is a stable matching with minimal wages.
2.3.2 The game
We define the oligopoly game with flexible wages as follows. The primitives are
X,ΘX , ηX , c(·), Qi and the set of players I.
1. Firms simultaneously choose quantities qi in the compact intervals Qi.
2. After capacity choices q, workers are hired according to a matching stable
with respect to [ηX , q]. Let p denote the unique vector of market clearing
cutoffs, and let µ be a stable matching with minimal wages.
3. Each firm’s payoff is given by
Πi =
ˆ
µ(i)
πi(µ(θ))dη(θ)− ci(qi)
where the continuously differentiable function ci(·) is the cost of investing
in capacity. That is, profits are the integral of the productivity of all
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contracts signed, minus the costs of investing in capacity. Because the
matching has minimal wages, this must equal
Πi =
ˆ
µ(i)
sθi − ūθdη(θ)− ci(qi),
that is, total surplus from all matched workers, minus the worker’s utility
from her second best option.
The game corresponds to a situation where firms first invest in capacities. The
matching and wages are then determined by the firm-optimal stable allocation
given those capacities. The interpretation is that first fims invest in capacities,
and then straightforwardly compete bidding up workers wages. Another plausi-
ble specification of the game would have been to assume that firms commit both
quantities and to a schedule of wages, conditional on worker types, and then
matching takes place. That is, firms can commit to paying wages according to
a formula, that takes all observable worker characteristics into account. Even
though the latter model seems reasonable in many cases, I chose to analyze the
first because it typically seems more relevant, given the limited level of commit-
ment that firms have in a market with flexible wages. In addition, it more closely
resembles the equilibrium concepts used in previous work in the assortative case
(Bulow and Levin (2006); Gabaix and Landier (2008); Tervio (2008); Mailath et
al. (2010)). Moreover, it relates more closely to the Cournot model, where firms
commit to capacities, and then prices are given by competitive equilibrium.
However, it would be interesting to examine other strategic variables. In the
homogeneous goods case, for example, games with commitment variables such
as prices (Bertrand), prices and quantities (Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)), or
supply functions (supply function equilibria of Grossman (1981); Hart (1985);
Klemperer and Meyer (1989)) yield interesting insights. These possibilities may
also be interesting in the two-sided matching case, but in the interest of space
we leave them for future research.
2.3.3 Equilibrium
Let P (q) be the unique vector of market clearing cutoffs with respect to [ηX , q].
We will first consider a simple example of the model.
Example 2.21. There two firms, with no cost of investing in capacity, ci ≡ 0,
and Qi = [0, 1]. There is a mass 2 of workers, with surplus vectors (sθ1, sθ2) =
sθ = eθ +uθ uniformly distributed in [0, 1]2. Figure 4 illustrates a typical stable
matching, with cutoffs (p1, p2). Workers are always assigned to the firm where
sθi −pi is the highest, provided it is positive. Therefore, all workers with surplus
vectors in region H1 ∪H12 are assigned to firm 1, and the workers with surplus
vector in region H2 ∪H21 are assigned to firm 2 (Figure 4). To illustrate how
cutoffs are determined, consider the case where firm 1 sets q1 = 1/2, while firm
2 supplies maximum capacity q2 = 1. Since the mass of unemployed workers is
1/2, we must have
2 · p1p2 = 1/2.
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Figure 4: A stable matching, plotted over the set of possible surplus vectors
sθ = (sθ1, s
θ
2) = u
θ + eθ.
Moreover, the market clearing equation for firm 1 yields
q1 = 1/2 = 2(1− p1)p2 + 2(1− p1)2/2.
Solving these equations yields p1 ≈ .60 and p2 ≈ .42.21 Note that not all workers
are assigned to the firm where surplus sθi is the highest. Since firms have limited
capacity, workers are instead assigned to where sθi − pi is the highest. In the
example, because firm 1 has smaller capacity, it has a higher cutoff, and therefore
some worker with higher surplus at firm 1 (sθ1 > sθ2) are assigned to firm 2.
Consider now a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium, where q1 = q2 = q∗.
By market clearing, cutoffs are given by q∗ = 1 − p∗2, where p∗ = Pi(q∗, q∗).
Some algebra shows that the derivative of Πi with respect to qi is given by
MRi(q
∗, q∗) = p∗ − (1− p∗)2 · (−dPj
dqi
).
Solving the first order condition then yields that in equilibrium p∗ ≈ .36 and
q∗ ≈ .87.22
The example shows that, unsurprisingly, firms have incentives to reduce
quantity when wages are personalized. The interesting point is that, although
21The exact formulas are complicated, as p1 is the solution to a cubic equation. Some
algebra yields
p1 = −2/3 cos
(
1/3 arctan
(
3/5
√
3
√
37
))
+ 2/3 + 2/3 sin
(
1/3 arctan
(
3/5
√
3
√
37
))√
3
and p2 = 1/4p1.
22The exact value is the solution to a cubic equation.
p∗ = −1/6
√
3
√
7 cos
(
1/3 arctan
(
2/9
√
3
√
79
))
+1/2+1/2
√
7 sin
(
1/3 arctan
(
2/9
√
3
√
79
))
,
and q∗ = 1− p∗2.
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firms may reduce quantity with either fixed or flexible wages, the reasons to do
so are very different. When wages are uniform, firms choose to reduce quantity
when their preferences are heterogeneous, so that firing a worker may set off a
profitable rejection chain. With personalized wages, we will see that firms choose
to reduce quantity exactly when their incentives coincide. Given quantities q,
let the set of agents that are hired by firm i but are not coveted by any other
firms as
Hi(q) = {θ|sθi ≥ pi, sθj < pj for all j 6= i}.
Moreover, define as Hij(q) the set of agents who are hired by firm i, and whose
second best choice is firm j.
Hij(q) = {θ|sθi − pi ≥ sθj − pj ≥ sθk − pk for all k 6= i, j and sθj − pj ≥ 0}.
Consider now the expression for the marginal revenue of firm i. Denote by the
revenue of firm i its profits net of investment costs. That is, Ri = Πi(q)+ci(qi).
We may write revenue as
Ri(q) =
ˆ
Hi(q)
sθi dη(θ) +
∑
j 6=i
ˆ
Hij(q)
sθi − sθj + Pj(q)dη(θ). (2)
The first term is the revenue from hiring workers for whom firm i is the sole
bidder. Since firm i captures all the surplus of the relationship, revenues in this
region are simply the integral of the surplus of each employment relationship.
The other terms are the sum of the profits from hiring workers for whom firm i
competes with firm j. In these region, revenue is the integral of surplus, but net
of the cost of outbidding firm j, which must be sθj − Pj(q) (that is, the surplus
firm j could obtain, minus firm j’s shadow price of capacity).
Let MRi be the derivative of revenue with respect to qi. The following
Theorem gives an expression for the marginal revenue of firm i.
Theorem 2.22. Assume the distribution of surplus vectors sθ has admits a
continuous density. Then P (q) is continuously differentiable at almost every
interior point q, and
MRi(q) = Pi(q)−
∑
j 6=i
η(Hij(q)) · (−
dPj(q)
dqi
).
Consequently, MRi(q) ≤ Pi(q).
The intuition behind the Theorem is as follows. If firm i raises its quantity
by a small amount dq, it hires some additional workers. These come from small
changes in the sets Hi, Hij of hires. Since all these new workers were on the
margin of being hired (because wages are flexible), the average profit from hiring
them must be Pi. This means a gain of Pidq in productivity. On the other hand,
by raising its quantity firm i drives up the cutoffs Pj of other firms. This means
that firm j will bid more aggressively for workers. Therefore firm i must pay an
extra −dPjdqi · dq for the mass η(Hij) of workers in the set Hij .
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As in the case of fixed wages, the marginal revenue curve MRi is lower than
the cutoff curve Pi. Therefore, in equilibrium, the profitability of a marginal
hired worker is again higher than the cost of investing in capacity (as in Figure
3, replacing the c′i + wi curve for c′i). Consequently, firms with market power
have incentives to reduce their capacities. The reason why is that a firm i with
nontrivial market share may affect the cutoffs Pj of other firms, and therefore
how much they are willing to bid for workers.
Note that firm i has more incentives to reduce capacity the larger the mass
of contested workers on the sets Hij . That is, the greater the number of workers
that both firms are interested in, the greater the incentives to reduce capacity.
This is the opposite of the conclusion from the analysis of markets with fixed
wages. With fixed wages, firms further distort their capacity choices the more
they disagree on who the best workers are. With flexible wages, distortions are
greater the more firms’ preferences agree.
3 Applications
3.1 Comparison between uniform and personalized wages
While in some markets workers are paid uniform wages in each firm, in others
wages are personalized. For example, most top American law firms pay all grad-
uating law students joining the firm as an associate the same wage. (Ginsburg
and Wolf (2003)). In contrast, senior lawyers receive personalized wages. When
a firm hires a partner from a rival firm, what practitioners call a lateral transac-
tion, the offer is often personalized, and lawyers of comparable seniority receive
very different wages. Likewise, major Web search engines charge different prices
from different advertisers. Google for example assigns each advertiser a “qual-
ity score”, calculated according to a secret formula, which confers advantages
in its auctions for advertisement slots (Edelman et al. (2007)). Moreover, in
markets organized around a centralized clearinghouse, a key design variable is
whether the matching mechanism should use uniform wages, or allow for flexible
wages, as in the mechanism proposed by Crawford (2008). Several papers have
looked at the question of which form of pricing is more efficient. However, in
most models in this literature, personalized prices always yield higher efficiency.
In contrast, the present model implies that personalized prices have benefits
(through higher matching efficiency) and costs (by possibly exacerbating quan-
tity distortions). We have the following result.
Theorem 3.1. For a given vector of capacities q, matching with personalized
wages is always more efficient. However, if firms are allowed to set quantities,
uniform wages may dominate personalized wages, as the latter may induce more
capacity manipulation.
Mailath et al. (2010)have proposed a continuum model of one-to-one assor-
tative matching in these comparing flexible and uniform wages. In their model,
due to the simple preferences, and each firm only hiring one worker, matching
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is always efficient. However they show that when prices are not personalized,
workers may not have the right ex-ante incentives to invest in skills, as the mar-
ket does not fully compensate them for it, which causes uniform wages to be less
efficient.23 More closely related to our model, Bulow and Levin (2006) propose a
discrete model of one-to-one assortative matching where firms must make wage
offers simultaneously. Because firms must make offers simultaneously, if wages
are uniform they employ mixed strategies. Therefore, the uniform wages gener-
ate a small degree of inefficiency vis a vis personalized wages. The model also
implies that wages are lower, and more compressed than in the flexible case.24
To see how uniform wages may yield higher efficiency than personalized
wages, we consider an example of the Bulow and Levin (2006) model (albeit
with each firm hiring a continuum of workers). We will show that, varying how
similar firms are, we can reverse the Bulow and Levin (2006) result, and make
either uniform or personalized wages more efficient. There are two firms i = 1, 2,
and a mass 1 of workers. Worker types are indexed by a productivity parameter
θ uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. At firm 1, a worker of type θ generates eθ1 = θ.
However, firm two is more productive, and multiplies the output of a worker
eθ2 = Aθ = (1 + ε)θ, 0 < ε < (
√
5− 1)/2. Workers are assumed to have utility 0
from matching with either firm, and in case they offer equal wages they choose
randomly between them.25 Capacity at each firm is constrained to the interval
Qi = [0, 1/2], and there are no costs of investing in capacity ci ≡ 0.
Consider first the case of uniform wages, where firms play the game in Section
2.2. In this case, equilibrium coincides with the solution in Bulow and Levin
(2006). Firms offer random wages, since a deterministic wage offer could be
undercut by a rival. However, the most efficient firm 2 pays on average higher
wages, and Pr(w2 > w1) = (1 + 2ε)/2(1 + ε) > 1/2. , Firms always supply
the maximum quantity qi = 1/2. While this is a mixed equilibrium, this is
consistent with the findings of Section 2.2, where we saw that the incentives
to reduce capacity when wages are uniform and preferences are homogeneous
is small. Therefore, uniform wages imply allocative inefficiency with positive
probability, but no quantity reduction.
The opposite happens with personalized wages. Given quantities, match-
ing is efficient. However, aligned preferences and flexible wages give both firms
strong incentives to reduce capacity. Applying our formulae for marginal rev-
enue, we obtainMR1 = p1−q1/A, whileMR2 = p2−q2. Equilibrium quantities
are therefore highly depressed, as depicted in Figure 3. We have
q∗1 =
1 + ε
3 + 3 ε+ ε2
, q∗2 =
1 + 2 ε+ ε2
3 + 3 ε+ ε2
.
23The inefficiency due to workers not investing in skills because they do not receive the full
value of the surplus they generate is similar to the inefficiency in the classic analysis of the
hold up problem due to incomplete contracting, albeit here it arises in a market setting (Klein
et al. (1978); Grossman and Hart (1984)).
24See also Kojima (2007); Niederle (2007) for some responses to this model. Crawford (2008)
proposes a modification that increases the wage flexibility of the NRMP.
25This violates assumption 2.13, which was made to ensure that a stable matching exists.
Nevertheless, a stable matching exists in this example.
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If ε ≈ 0, we have qi ≈ 1/3.
Calculating surplus, we find that uniform wages are more efficient for ε ≤ .41,
while flexible wages are more efficient for ε > .41. The intuition is that, when
both firms have similar productivities, the cost of allocative inefficiency is small.
Therefore the quantity distortion dominates the allocative inefficiency. However,
when one firm is much more productive than the other, the allocative inefficiency
of uniform wages dominates, and personalized wages yield higher efficiency.
3.1.1 College Admissions and the Overlap
A well-known anti-trust case in matching markets is U.S. v. Brown University,
et al., where the U.S. Department of Justice sued the eight the Ivy League
schools and MIT.26 Since the 1950s, the schools in the Ivy League had agreed
that it was in their best interest not to bid for top students that had been
admitted to multiple schools. The main reasoning was that, were they to spend
money bidding for star students, less funds would be available to provide support
for low income students. The schools then started meeting to share information
on students which were admitted to multiple schools. In the “Overlap meetings”,
they agreed to what was the necessary financial aid to the commonly admitted
students, and not to provide more aid than what was justified on a need basis.
The number of schools participating on the Overlap meetings grew over the
years, and in the 1970s it included MIT and 14 other schools.
In 1991, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ sued the Ivies and MIT for vio-
lating Section 1 of the Sherman act, by engaging in a conspiracy to fix prices.
The schools did not deny they were engaging in cooperative behavior. Instead,
their defense was that Antitrust law should not apply to them, for they are not
for-profit institutions. Moreover, they argued that the purpose of the Overlap
was not to raise revenues, but to guarantee that financial aid resources would be
allocated to students in need, and not to wealthy meritorious students. Even-
tually, all the schools except for MIT agreed to cease the practice. MIT was
then found guilty of price fixing in 1992. However, Congress passed a new law
in 1992 that allowed the schools to engage in some cooperative practices. The
1992 MIT conviction was then overturned in 1993, and a subsequent trial was
ordered. Finally, the government reached a 1993 settlement with MIT that
allowed it to engage in most of the challenged conduct.
Carlton et al. (1995) provide some empirical evidence that the practice of
the overlap had no effect on the average prices paid by the students. Moreover,
they argue that, since schools are not for-profit enterprises, and instead have a
complex objective function, the Antitrust laws should not apply. In addition,
that the “conduct prevented the flow of school resources to high-income students
at the expense of needy students”. On the other side of the debate, Grossman
(1995) argues that since money is fungible, a reduction in merit aid does not
necessarily increase need-based aid, and may reduce efficiency.
A normative analysis of this issue depends on assumptions on the objectives
26See Carlton et al. (1995).
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of the Ivy schools, and is beyond the scope of this paper. However, from a
purely positive perspective, it seems reasonable to assume that not-for-profit
Universities prefer some students from others, and also that they attach some
positive value to financial resources (which may be used to maximize other goals
they may have, however complex those may be). Therefore, the present frame-
work may be used as a descriptive model of this market, with firms representing
the schools, and workers representing the students. A coarse approximation is
to consider the overlap as offering uniform wages (Section 2.2), and the non-
overlap market having flexible wages and schools bidding for the best workers
(Section 2.3). The model then predicts that the overlap changes the tradeoff
faced by the Universities when determining optimal class size qi. If we assume
that preferences are homogeneous, so that schools mostly agree on which the
best students are, then marginal revenue curves are lower under personalized
rather than uniform wages. Therefore, firms would have more incentives to re-
duce class size, as depicted in Figure 3. The schools could argue, that ending
the overlap would cause them to bid for star students, but without significantly
changing the matching between students and universities. However although
the bidding would imply a small gain in matching efficiency, it could give uni-
versities large incentives to reduce capacity, and make the final allocation less
efficient. Even though Carlton et al. (1995) give evidence that the overlap did
not change the average tuition payments, to my knowledge the effects of the
overlap on class size have not been investigated.
3.2 Unravelling
A common market failure in entry level job markets is unravelling - the tendency
of firms to hire workers earlier each year, trying to move ahead of each other.
Unravelling of hiring dates has been observed in field (Roth and Xing (1994);
Niederle and Roth (2003); McKinney et al. (2005)) and experimental (McKinney
et al. (2005); Niederle et al. (2008)) settings, and has been the key market failure
associated with the collapse of several markets (Roth (1991); Roth and Xing
(1994)).
The standard rationale for unravelling is that there is some imperfect in-
formation about preferences. By accepting an early offer, a worker is in effect
buying insurance against the possibility that she will receive a low quality match
(Roth and Xing (1994); Li and Rosen (1998); Suen (2000); Niederle et al. (2008);
Halaburda (2009); Fainmesser (n.d.); Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010)). In partic-
ular, these theories explain why a firm may choose to hire at a date where less
information is available. However it does not explain why firms would want to
act first, but at a point in time where the same information about preferences
is known.27
27Recently, these ideas have been applied to early action and early admission programs at
American universities (Avery et al. (2001, 2004); Avery and Levin (2009); Chade et al. (n.d.);
Lee (2009)). Avery and Levin (2009) propose a model where early action programs, which
give students the option to enroll early, are used to let students signal their preferences over
schools. Moreover, early decision programs, where students commit to accept or reject an
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The imperfect competition model suggests a complementary rationale for
unravelling, which does not rely on the arrival of new information. Simply put,
strategic complementarities give firms incentives to act first. That is, early
hiring can be viewed as a commitment device, yielding a first mover advantage.
If, for example, the quantities played by firms are strategic substitutes, a firm
has incentives to hire a large number of workers early on, effectively committing
to be more aggressive, and therefore inducing the other firm to be less aggressive.
To see how firms have incentives hire early in a simple setting, we return
to the example of Section 2.1.4, where two firms with Qi = [0, 1] compete for
a mass 2 of workers with uniformly distributed productivities and preferences.
We assume, however, that each firm may pay a cost ci to hire a day early.
The ci are private information of each firm, and drawn independently from a
distribution F (·), with a continuous density f(·) with support [0,∞). Timing is
as follows. First, firms observe the ci. They then decide simultaneously whether
to incur the cost ci and hire early. Next, firms hiring early simultaneously
supply capacity qi. Firms hiring late then choose capacity. Finally, workers
are matched according to the unique stable matching given reported capacities.
We make the assumption that the outcome is the unique stable matching with
respect to (q1, q2) for starkness, to completely shut down the insurance channel
considered in the literature. In effect this assumption implies that early hiring
simply changes the order in which the qi are chosen, but not the final matching
given qi. The motivation is that, since there is perfect information, rational
workers will anticipate the quantity choices of firms that act late. Therefore, no
worker would accept an early offer that is worse than what she could receive in
the second day of hiring.
Conditional on the decision to enter early, firm behavior is simple. Denote
by Πtt′ the payoff net of ci of a firm hiring at date t, while its opponent hires
at date t′, for t, t′ equal to E,L standing for early and late. If both firms
hire at the same date, equilibrium is as in Section 2.1.4, yielding payoffs of
ΠEE = ΠLL = 14 − 6
√
5. However, if only one of the firms hires early, it is a
Stackelberg leader, and gets to set its quantity first. The optimum is for the
leader to set quantity equal to the cap of 1. The intuition is that the leader acts
more aggressively, inducing the other firm to reduce its capacity. Payoffs in this
case are given by ΠEL = 3/5 and ΠLE = 9/16.
Since the expected payoff of entering early is strictly decreasing in c, in
equilibrium there must be a value of c∗ > 0 such that a firm enters iff ci ≤ c∗.
In a symmetric equilibrium, a firm with cost of exactly c∗ must be indifferent
between entering or not. Therefore, c∗ must solve
F (c∗) · [ΠEE −ΠLE ] + [1− F (c∗)] · [ΠEL −ΠLL] = c∗.
For c∗ = 0, the left-hand side of the expression is positive, and the right-
early offer, are used by low ranked schools in a manner analogous to early offers in unravelling
models, offering insurance to students who are unsure of their qualifications. While their model
relies on (at least some level of) incomplete information about one’s own skills, the present
model suggests that early action policies could also be used due to imperfect competition, and
universities seeking a first mover advantage.
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Figure 5: Probability of unravelling given the mean λ of the cost of early hiring.
hand side is zero. As c∗ approaches +∞, the left-hand side is bounded, while
the right-hand side goes to infinity. Therefore, at least one equilibrium exists.
To illustrate the result, consider the case where F (·) is an exponential distri-
bution with mean λ. Figure 5 plots the probability that unravelling occurs (at
least one firm hires early), given λ. To gauge the size of the cost c, note that
the value to either firm of hiring the entire worker pool would be 1. Therefore,
if the mean costs of hiring one day in advance are at most 1% of the value of
the entire worker pool, the unravelling probability is close to 100%. Moreover,
even if the mean costs are approximately 10% of the value of the entire worker
pool, the unravelling probability is still above 30%. This suggests that strate-
gic complementarities may be an important channel generating unravelling in
matching markets.
4 Conclusion
The large literature in two-sided matching markets leaves strategic interactions
between participants to the sidelines. In contrast, the industrial organization lit-
erature puts strategic interactions, imperfect competition, and Nash equilibrium
in the center stage, but typically does not consider settings with rich heteroge-
neous preferences over trading partners. This paper contributes to bridging this
gap, by offering a simple, tractable equilibrium model of imperfect competition
in many to one matching markets. This is a first step towards understanding
firm behavior, and its implications for the design and regulation of matching
markets.
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The main contribution of the analysis is to extend standard price-theoretic
insights of the Cournot model to matching markets. Market power induces a
wedge between the marginal revenue of a firm, and the net productivity of a
marginal worker it may hire. Interestingly, the determinants of the size of this
wedge are very different when wages are uniform (as in the market junior law
associates) or personalized (as in the market for senior lawyers). With uniform
wages, the wedge exists due to heterogeneous preferences between firms, which
mean that rejecting a worker may create a beneficial rejection chain. When
wages are personalized, though, the wedge exists because of aligned preferences.
Firms that reduce capacity increase the pool of available workers, which induces
its competitors to bid less aggressively for workers that both firms covet.
These insights help to inform the debate over the desirability of uniform
versus flexible wages. We have seen that taking strategic capacity setting into
account qualifies the Bulow and Levin (2006) conclusion that flexible wages
always generate more efficiency. In their model, if firms are allowed to choose
capacity, flexible wages do produce higher matching efficiency given quantities,
but they also give more incentives for firms to reduce capacities. Flexible wages
are still more efficient if firms are sufficiently heterogeneous. However, if they
are very similar, so that the loss from matching inefficiencies is small, uniform
wages produce higher welfare, as they cause less capacity reduction. The model
also yields a new rationale for unravelling, that firms may wish to hire early to
get a first mover advantage, due to strategic complementarities.
An important omission of the model is the focus on quantity competition.
While in industrial organization quantity competition models figure promi-
nently, they are by no means the only models available. It would be inter-
esting to explore matching markets where firms have a different set of strategic
variables at their disposal. For example, how much firms try to differentiate
themselves, target specific market segments, or allowing firms to misrepresent
their preferences. Another shortcoming is that, at the level of generality that we
consider here, many interesting phenomena from real matching markets cannot
be explained. A hallmark of matching markets is the importance of institu-
tional details. Therefore, it would be interesting in future research to specialize
the model to study features of specific markets, and inform the market design
in real-world cases. Hopefully, the present model will provide a useful basic
framework to pursue this line of research.
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A Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
A.1 Uniform Wages
A.1.1 Stable Matchings
Before proving results relating to the game per se, we have to develop some
preliminaries on stable matchings. We consider a set of agents Θ and firms I,
as in section 2.1.1. Cutoffs will play an important role in the analysis, therefore
the definitions of section 2.1.3 will also be used. The first result guarantees that
with strict preferences there is a bijection between stable matchings and market
clearing cutoffs.
Lemma A.1. (Cutoff Lemma - Azevedo and Leshno (2010)) Assume η satisfies
the strict preferences assumption 2.1. Then stable matchings exist. Moreover,
if µ is a stable matching, then Pµ is a market clearing cutoff. If p is a market
clearing cutoff, then µ = Mp is a stable matching. In addition, P and M are
inverses of each other in the sets of market clearing cutoffs and stable matchings.
Proof. This is a restatement of the Cutoff Lemma of Azevedo and Leshno (2010),
which we refer to for a proof.
Note that this result does not depend on the assumption of a unique stable
matching existing. We now use it to prove Proposition 2.2, which gives sufficient
conditions for the set of stable matchings to have a unique element. Moreover,
the particular version of the cutoff Lemma used in the text, Lemma 2.6, follows
directly from this result, and our assumption in the text that there is a unique
market clearing cutoff associated with [η, q].
Proof. (Proposition 2.2) By the previous Lemma, we only have to show that
there is a unique market clearing cutoff. By the Lattice Theorem (Azevedo
and Leshno (2010)), there exists a minimum and a maximum market clearing
cutoffs p′ ≤ p. Any worker that is employed under p must be employed over p′.
Moreover, all workers in the set
A = T ∩ ({eθ < p}\{eθ < p′})
must be employed under p′ but not under p. Therefore, the difference in the
mass of unemployed workers under p and p′ must be at least as large as η(A).
However, by the Rural Hospitals Theorem (Azevedo and Leshno (2010)), the
mass of unemployed workers is constant in all stable matchings. Consequently,
η(A) = 0. By the assumption made in the statement of the Proposition, this
implies p = p′, and therefore there is a unique stable matching.
In the text, we denote by P (q) the unique market clearing cutoff associated
with a vector of capacities q, and implicitly a measure η. In the appendix,
it will be useful to sometimes make the dependence on η explicit. We will
abuse notation and write P ([η, q]). Moreover, whenever there is more than
one market clearing cutoff associated with η, we will use the same notation
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for the correspondence of market clearing cutoffs. Some of our results depend
on topological properties of this correspondence. Henceforth, we will use the
standard Euclidean topology for the set of cutoffs. For the set of measures η, we
will use the weak-* topology, sometimes also referred to as weak convergence of
measures.
Proposition A.2. (Continuity) Assume η satisfies the strict preferences as-
sumption 2.1, and that P ([η, q]) has a unique element. Then P is continuous
in a neighborhood of [η, q].
Proof. This is part of the statement of Azevedo and Leshno (2010) Theorem
2.
Finally, we provide a proof of the monotonicity result in Lemma 2.7.
Proof. (Lemma 2.7) Let p = P (q), p′ = P (q′), and p̂ be the sup of the vectors
p and p′. For every i it is always the case that either p̂i = pi or p′i. If p̂i = pi,
then because for all j 6= i we have p̂j ≥ pj we must have Di(p̂) ≥ Di(p). If
p̂i = p
′
i then by the same logic Di(p̂) ≥ Di(p′) ≥ Di(p). Therefore p̂ ≥ p and
D(p̂) ≥ D(p). Since
∑
iDi(p̂) ≤
∑
iDi(p), we must have D(p̂) = D(p). If
pi > 0, then Di(p̂) = Di(p) = qi. If pi = 0 and p̂i = 0 then Di(p̂i) ≤ qi. Finally,
if pi = 0 and p̂i > 0 then Di(p̂i) ≥ Di(p′i) = q′i ≥ qi, so that Di(p̂i) = qi.
Therefore, p̂ = P (q). By the uniqueness assumption, p̂ = p, and therefore
p′ ≤ p.
A.1.2 The Oligopoly Game with Exogenous Wages
We may now prove Proposition 2.4, which guarantees the existence of a mixed
strategy equilibrium.
Proof. (Proposition 2.4) Since payoffs Π(q) can be written as a continuous func-
tion of P (q), and by Proposition A.2 P (q) depends continuously on q, then
payoffs must depend continuously on q. Moreover, the strategy space of each
agent is a compact interval of the real line. Therefore, it follows from Glicks-
berg’s 1952 theorem (FT pp 35 theorem 1.3) that a mixed-strategy equilibrium
exists.
We may also prove Proposition 2.11, which guarantees that the profit func-
tions are continuously differentiable almost everywhere, and provides an expres-
sion for marginal revenues.
Proof. (Proposition 2.11)
First, note that since η admits a continuous density, the demand function
D(p) may be written as
D(p) =
ˆ
(Mp)(i)
f(θ)dθ,
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where
Mp(i) = {θ ∈ Θ|eθi ≥ pi, eθj < pj for all jsuch that j θ i, i θ θ}. (3)
Therefore, by Leibniz’s rule for differentiation under the integral sign, D(p) is
continuously differentiable.
Let Q∗ be the set of interior points of Q. That is, the interior of the set of
points q such that all η(µq(i)) = qi. Note that, in Q∗, market clearing cutoffs
P (q) are the single root of the equation D(P (q)) = q. By Sard’s theorem,28 for
almost every point q ∈ Q∗, D(·) is continuously differentiable at P (q), and its
derivative is nonsingular. Therefore, by the inverse function theorem, P (q) is
continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of q.
Given a quantity vector q, and cutoffs P (q), the revenue of firm i may be
written as
Ri(q) =
ˆ
(MP (q))(i)
eθi · f(θ)dθ. (4)
If P is continuously differentiable at q, the formula for the marginal revenue in
the Proposition follows directly from an application of Leibniz’s rule.
We now prove Proposition 2.12, which guarantees that when either side of
the market has homogeneous cardinal preferences, then firms have no incentives
to reduce capacity.
Proof. (Proposition 2.12) Consider first the case where all workers have the same
preferences. Without loss of generality, assume that all of them have preference
ordering 1, 2, · · · , I.29 Note that, by the market clearing equations, cutoffs Pi(q)
do not depend on qj for j > i. In addition, by the formula for the set of matched
students Mp(i) in equation 3 in the proof of Proposition 2.11, we have that
revenue Ri(q) may be written as a function R̃i(P1(q), P2(q), · · · , Pi−1(q), Pi(q)),
that does not depend on Pk(q) for k > i. If we consider an interior point q and
q′ with q′i = qi + ε, ε > 0 and q′j = qj for all other coordinates, we have
Ri(q
′) = R̃i(P1(q
′), P2(q
′), · · · , Pi−1(q′), Pi(q))
= R̃i(P1(q), P2(q), · · · , Pi−1(q), Pi(q′)).
Therefore, using again equation 3, Ri(q′)−Ri(q) may be written as
ˆ
A
eθi dη(θ),
where
A = {eθj < Pj(q) for all j < i, Pi(q′) ≤ eθi < Pi(q)}.
28See Milnor (1997).
29We are assuming that all firms are considered acceptable by the workers, as firms which
no worker finds acceptable play no role in the proof.
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Because P (·) in continuous, the productivity eθi of all workers in the set A
is approximately Pi(q). Moreover, as the measure of A is ε, we have that
Ri(q
′)−Ri(q) = Pi(q) · ε+ o(ε).
Therefore, Ri(·) is differentiable at q with derivative Pi(q), completing the proof.
Now consider the second case, where firms have the same ordinal preferences
in the support of η. First, note that there must exist increasing continuous
functions f2, f3, · · · , fI such that the support of η equals the set
{(eθ1, f2(eθ1), · · · , fI(eθ1))|eθ1 ∈ [0, 1]}.
To see this, note first that the support must include points with all possible
values of eθ1 ∈ [0, 1]. If it did not, the unique stable matching assumption would
be violated, as there would exist p̄ with {p ∈ [0, 1]I : ||p1− p̄1|| < δ} outside the
support of η. Therefore, D(p) would be constant in p1 in a neighborhood of p̄,
and so there would be more than one market clearing cutoff associated with η
and q = D(p̄). In addition, for a given value of eθ1, by the homogeneous ordinal
preferences assumption, the support may only contain one point. We denote
this point as (eθ1, f2(eθ1), · · · , fI(eθ1)), which defined the functions fi. Again, by
the homogeneous ordinal preferences assumption, the fi are strictly increasing.
Moreover, they must be continuous, as otherwise the support of θ would not
include points with some value of eθi ∈ [0, 1], which would violate the unique
stable matching assumption, by the argument used before.
With this observation in hand, the rest of the proof is simple, and similar
to the first part. Let fθ1 be the identity map. Note that, for all i, eθi ≤ Pi iff
eθ1 ≤ f−1i (Pi). Therefore, given an interior point q, we may denote the firms
which are more selective than firm 1 as
I+(q) = {i : f−1i (Pi(q)) > P1(q)}
Note that, by the market clearing equations, a small change in qi does not
affect Pi(q) for i ∈ I+. Now take an interior point q and q′ with q′i = qi + ε,
ε > 0 and q′j = qj for all other coordinates. By the definition of the demand
function, all points in the symmetric difference µq(1)4 µq′(1) must satisfy
Pi(q
′) ≤ eθi < P i(q)
for some i ∈ I. For small ε, we have Pi(q′) = Pi(q) for i ∈ I+(q), and therefore
the equation has to hold for some i ∈ I\I+(q). Therefore we must have eθ1 ≤
P1(q). Since, by the definition of the demand function, every point in the
symmetric difference must also satisfy P1(q′) ≤ eθ1, we must have
P1(q
′) ≤ eθ1 < P1(q).
Therefore, using the same argument as before on the continuity of P , we must
have that the revenue of firm 1 is differentiable at q, and MR1(q) = P1(q).
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A.1.3 Endogenous Uniform Wages
We begin with the Proposition that guarantees existence of a mixed strategy
equilibrium.
Proof. (Proposition 2.15) Note that the under our assumptions the measure
η([ηu, w]) varies continuously on w. Therefore the continuity result in Proposi-
tion A.2 implies that P varies continuously in (q, w). The same argument used
in the proof of Proposition 2.4 then guarantees existence of a mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium.
We now turn to the characterization of marginal revenue.
Proof. Since P̄ is continuously differentiable, so is revenue, and Pi(q) = qi ·P̄ (q).
Having established the differentiability of P , the formula for the derivative with
respect to q follows from the argument in the proof of Proposition 2.11. The
formula for the derivative with respect to w is a straightforward calculation.
A.1.4 Matching With Contracts
The matching framework used in Section 2.3 is a particular case of the model
in the Appendix D of Azevedo and Leshno (2010). As observed in Azevedo
and Leshno (2010)’s Appendix D.3, the existence of stable matchings, Rural
Hospitals Theorem, and Lattice Theorem hold in this setting. Therefore, the
proof of Proposition 2.18, which guarantees that there exists a unique market
clearing cutoff, is identical to the proof of Proposition 2.2.
Proof. (Proposition 2.20) The Proposition simply collects some results from
Azevedo and Leshno (2010). The existence of stable matchings and market
clearing cutoffs is established in Azevedo and Leshno (2010) Appendix D.3. The
fact that P andM take stable matchings into market clearing cutoffs and vice
versa follows from the cutoff lemma for matching with contracts in Appendix
D.2. As for the fact that agents are always matched one of the firms i with
highest sθi − pi, this is proved in Azevedo and Leshno (2010) Appendix D.4
which considers the transferable utility case.
It only remains to prove Proposition 2.22, which characterizes marginal rev-
enue.
Proof. (Proposition 2.22) The proof that P (q) is differentiable for almost every
interior point q is exactly the same as in the case with exogenous wages given in
the proof of Proposition 2.11. We therefore take an interior point q where P (·)
is differentiable, and derive the formula for the marginal revenue. The formula
for marginal revenue then follows directly from the formula for the revenue
Ri(q) of firm i in equation 2, and a direct application of Leibniz’s formula for
differentiation under the integral sign.
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A.2 Applications
A.2.1 Comparison between uniform and personalized wages
Proof. (Theorem 3.1) The proof that, with endogenous capacities, uniform
wages may dominate follows from the example given in the text. Therefore
it only remains to prove that, for a fixed capacity vector q, personalized wages
generate at least as much welfare as matching with uniform wages. Consider a
set of workers ΘX satisfying the requirements of both the model with uniform
and the model with flexible wages. Let a generalized allocation be a measurable
map
x : ΘX → [0, 1]I+1
designating a distribution x(θ) of each worker type over firms, with I + 1 rep-
resenting being unemployed. Therefore both a stable matching with uniform
wages and a stable matching with contracts induce an allocation, and one that
only takes values in the extreme points of the simplex. Given a generalized
allocation, we can calculate social welfare as
ˆ
ΘX
sθ · x(θ)dη(θ),
as social welfare does not depend on the specific contracts nor on wages. Con-
sider now the problem of finding a generalized allocation that maximizes social
welfare subject to feasibility constraints
max
´
ΘX
sθ · x(θ)dη(θ)
s.t.
´
ΘX
xi(θ)dη(θ) ≤ qi for i = 1, · · · , I.
A standard compacity argument implies that such a maximum value is at-
tained by at least one generalized allocation x∗. Moreover, because the problem
has allocations x where all constraints are strictly at slack,
´
ΘX
xi(θ)dη(θ) < qi
for all i, strong Lagrange duality holds. By Theorem 1 pp. 217 from Luenberger
(1969), there exist numbers λi ≥ 0 such that x∗ maximizes
ˆ
ΘX
sθ · x(θ)dη(θ) +
I∑
i=1
λi · [qi −
ˆ
ΘX
xi(θ)dη(θ)]
over all generalized allocations. Moreover, if λi > 0, then
´
ΘX
xi(θ)dη(θ) = qi.
Note that we can rewrite the expression above as
I∑
i=1
ˆ
ΘX
(sθi − λi) · xi(θ)dη(θ).
Therefore, any maximizer x∗ satisfies that almost every type θ is matched
with probability 1 to a firm that maximizes sθi − λi. So the measure of workers
x∗ allocates to each firm equals the demand for each firm when market clearing
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cutoffs are equal to λ, in the matching with contracts model. Therefore λ
is a vector of market clearing cutoffs in the matching with contracts model.
Since the market clearing cutoffs are unique, we have λ = P (q). Therefore,
the generalized allocation x∗ coincides almost everywhere with the generalized
allocation induced by any stable matching with contracts. Therefore any stable
matching with contracts maximizes social welfare. In particular, any stable
matching with uniform wages generates weakly lower welfare, completing the
proof.
Details of the calculation from the example comparing uniform and person-
alized wages follow below.
For the case of uniform wages, the reasoning follows Bulow and Levin (2006).
Although in their model each firm hires a single worker, the argument is similar
in the discrete case. Assume for now that both firms set qi = 1/2. The firm that
offers higher wages attracts workers with an average quality of 3/4, while the
firm with lower wages attracts workers with an average quality of 1/4. Following
their algorithm to characterize equilibrium, firms must offer random wages, with
distributions Gi(·) with the same interval as support. To find this support, we
consider each firm’s first order condition with respect to wage in an interior
point of the interval, as each firm must be indifferent between offering any wage
in the support. We have
g1(w) ·A · 1/2 = 1
g2(w) · 1/2 = 1.
Therefore the density of firm 2’s offer is g2(w) = 2. As argued in Bulow
and Levin (2006) pp. 659, the lowest wage offered must be zero. Therefore the
support of the distributions is [0, 1/2]. Firm 2 offers a wage uniformly in this
interval. Firm 1 has a density of only 2/A. According to the Bulow and Levin
(2006) algorithm, with probability 1/A it offers a wage uniformly at random in
the interval [0, 1/2], and offers 0 otherwise. Consequently, the probability that
firm 2 offers a higher wage is 1/2A.
We now show that it is in the interest of both firms to set qi = 1/2. We will
do the calculation for firm 2, as firm 1’s case is analogous. If firm 1 plays q1 = 1
and w1 uniformly distributed in [0, 1/2], firm 2’s gain from offering q2, w2 with
w2 ≤ 1/2 is
2w2 · (
2− q2
2
− w2) · q2 + (1− 2w2) · (
1− q2
2
− w2) · q2.
We can see that the maximum of this expression in q2 ∈ [0, 1/2] is attained
with q2 = 1/2.
Consider now the case of personalized wages. Workers have surplus vectors
sθ = (sθ1, s
θ
2) uniformly distributed in the segment [(0, 0), (1, A)] in <2. Therefore
firm 2 always hires the q2 best workers, and firm 1 hires the next q1 best ones.
The market clearing equations imply p1 = 1− q1 − q2, and p2 = ε(1− q2) + p1.
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We have η(H21) = q2, whereas η(H12) = 1 − q2 − p2/A = q1/A. Therefore the
marginal revenue formula yields
MR2 = p2 − q2
MR1 = p1 − q1/A.
To solve for equilibrium we only have to set MR1 = MR2 = 0, and the
formula in the text for q∗1 and q∗2 obtains.
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